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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah R.
App. P. and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d)

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The legal issue presented for review is one of first impression in the State of Utah:

Should a landlord who serves a notice

to pay rent or quit upon its tenant when the tenant is not in
default of its rental obligations be held responsible for damages
sustained by the tenant who vacates the premises pursuant to the
notice to quit?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Only one question of law is on review in this case.

The

appropriate standard of review is that where the issue on appeal
is one of law, the appellate court need not accord any deference
to the trial court's view of the law.

See, e.g., Ron Case

Roofing and Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah
1989) .

CITATION TO THE RECORD
Citations to the record herein will be as follows: "R"
followed by the page number in the record where the reference can
be located.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:

This appeal is from a final judgment and order of the Third
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of
Utah.

The case arose from the following background.

Plaintiff

was leasing property from defendant to operate an antique shop in
Salt Lake City.

R. at 157.

Defendant served upon plaintiff a

three-day notice to pay rent or quit on November 20, 1991.
159.

R. at

The notice to quit was served despite the fact that no rent

was due at the time.

R. at 148.

It is plaintiff's position that

it had pre-paid rent through December 21, 1991. R. at 158 and
159.

It is undisputed that no rent was due as of November 20,

1991 when the notice to quit was served.
and 71.

See, e.g., R. at pp. 70

In response to the notice to quit, plaintiff began

vacating the premises by removing inventory.

R. at 256.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the notice to quit
constitutes a constructive or wrongful eviction; that it would
not have left the premises when it did if the notice had not been
served; that it suffered damages as a result of the wrongful
eviction and that punitive damages should be assessed against
defendant.
B.

See R. at pp. 1 - 5 .
Course of Proceeding and Disposition

A motion for summary judgment was filed by defendant arguing, inter alia, that the service of a notice to pay rent or quit
- 2 -

upon a tenant who is not in default in its rental obligation
cannot constitute a wrongful eviction.

The court ultimately

granted defendant's motion for summary judgment expressly ruling
that a notice to pay rent or quit cannot, without more, constitute a wrongful eviction even though the rent may have been paid,
since the eviction notice sets forth alternatives (i.e.. pay rent
or leave the premises within three days) and it was plaintiff who
chose to vacate the premises.

R. at pp. 340 and 341.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Due to the court's summary judgment which was based upon its
interpretation of the law rather than an evaluation of facts, the
basic facts relevant for this appeal appear to be as follows:
1.

Plaintiff was leasing the subject property from defen-

dant to conduct a retail business.
2.

R. at p. 157.

On November 20, 1991, plaintiff was served with a

three-day notice to pay rent or quit.

R. at p. 159.

A true and correct copy of the notice to pay rent or quit is
included in the appendix hereto.
3.

At the time the notice to pay rent or quit was served,

there was no rent due and owing.

R. at pp. 158 and 159.

(It is

plaintiff's position that rent had been paid through December 21,
1991.

R. at pp. 158 and 159.)
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4.

In response to the notice to quit, plaintiff immedi-

ately began moving its inventory from the premises in order to
comply with the notice to quit (R. at p. 256) and suffered
damages as set forth in its complaint.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Service of a notice to pay rent or quit upon a tenant who
has already paid rent and is not in breach of its rental obligations constitutes a constructive or wrongful eviction if the
tenant responds to the three-day notice to quit by vacating the
premises.

A landlord should not be permitted to escape responsi-

bility when it wrongfully serves a notice to quit and the tenant
reacts to that notice to its detriment.

ARGUMENT
Under Utah's traditional definition of constructive eviction, such an eviction occurs when a tenant's right of possession
and enjoyment of the leased premises is interfered with by the
landlord so as to render the premises or part thereof unsuitable
for the purposes intended.
(Utah 1982).

See Brugger v. Fonoti. 645 P.2d 647

"The whole point of Constructive eviction' is that

the landlord basically drove the tenant out through the landlord's action or inaction . . .fl Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P. 2d 140,
142 (Utah App. 1992)
- 4 -

The issue in this case is one of first impression in Utah:
Should a landlord who serves a notice to pay rent or quit upon a
tenant be excused of liability for damages sustained by the
tenant who vacates the premises pursuant to the notice to quit
when the tenant is not in default of its rental obligations•
Plaintiff submits that a landlord should be held liable.

Howev-

er, the trial court in this case ruled, as a matter of law, that
plaintiff had no constructive eviction claim against defendant.
The court held that because the notice to pay rent or vacate
gives the tenant alternative courses of action ((1) stay and pay
rent or (2) vacate), defendant was not liable for constructive
eviction.
The fundamental questions to be analyzed in this case is as
follows:

As between the landlord and tenant, who should bear the

risk of an improper notice to quit?

Plaintiff submits it is

consistent with sound public policy to make the landlord bear the
risk.

Otherwise, the tenant is forced to make the choice of

either (1) staying on the premises and hoping that it is correct
in believing that the rent has been paid, or (2) leaving the
premises in order to avoid the threats of the three day notice
(treble damages, costs, attorney's fees and forced eviction).

In

either event, the tenant is forced to make a determination due to
the conduct of the landlord and suffers the consequences of

- 5 -

making the wrong choice.

A tenant should not be faced with such

a dilemma.
Perhaps this issue can be analogized to tort law principals.
General tort law has long recognized that one who sets in motion
the forces which cause the harm will beheld responsible.

See

Armory Park Neighborhood Assn'n v. Episcopal Community Serv. in
Ariz.. 712 P.2d 914, 920 (Ariz. 1985).

See also State Nat'l.

Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 691 (Tex. App. 8th Dist.
1984) (where damage has resulted from a wrongful act which is the
original cause of an event, in that such event is a part of a
chain of events set in motion by a party, such party may be held
responsible for the total results) (citations omitted).
This same rationale should apply to a landlord who wrongfully or negligently serves a three-day notice to pay rent or
quit upon a tenant who is not in breach of its obligation to pay
rent.

The landlord sets events in motion by serving the notice

to quit.

The notice itself tells the tenant to get out in order

to avoid a parade of horribles (forced eviction, treble damages,
attorney's fees and costs).

The defense that the tenant was

unreasonable in choosing the alternative to vacate the premises
is not compelling.

Tenants may be inexperienced, uneducated,

unsophisticated or financially unable to seek legal help when
served with a notice to quit.

The language of a notice to quit

can be very threatening and intimidating.
- 6 -

Therefore, it is

clearly foreseeable that a tenant may vacate the premises pursuant to a notice to quit even when there has been no breach to
justify a notice to quit.
The law should place the risk on the landlord who serves an
improper notice to pay rent or quit.

It makes no sense for the

tenant to pay for a landlord's negligent mistake, or even worse,
intentional wrongful conduct.
In the present case, it is undisputed that on November 20,
1991, plaintiff was served with a notice to pay rent or quit
despite the fact that no rent was then due and owing.

Plaintiff

argues that such conduct should be considered a basis for a claim
of constructive eviction.

Case law from other jurisdictions

lends support to plaintiff's claim that notices to pay rent or
quit provide a basis for a claim of constructive eviction.

See

Dobbins v. Paul, 321 S.E.2d 540 (N.C. App. 1984) (When a wrongful
demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a
lessor or landlord and it is followed by immediate surrender of
possession by the lessee or tenant, a constructive eviction has
been accomplished).

See also Routal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati.

391 So.2d 308 (Fla. App. 1980).
Plaintiff submits that Utah law should likewise provide a
cause of action for constructive eviction when notices to pay
rent or quit are served when there is no rent due and owing.
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A

standard that permits a claim for constructive eviction based on
a wrongful notice to quit is consistent with sound public policy.
This court, if it upholds the trial court's ruling, will
send a message to landlords that they can harass, intimidate,
manipulate and threaten their tenants with notices to pay rent or
quit even if the tenants are not in breach of their rental
obligations.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests
this Court to rule that the trial court erred in holding a notice
to quit, without more, cannot constitute constructive eviction,
even when the rent has been paid and there is no rent due and
owing.

This Court should hold that service of a notice to pay

rent or quit when rent is not due constitutes a constructive or
wrongful eviction.

Furthermore, the order of the trial court

requiring plaintiff to pay costs should be reversed.

DATED this

h

day of February, 1994.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee

Donald J. Winder
Robert D. Tingey
John W. Holt
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APPENDIX

Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate
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Exhibit A

SQUIRE AHTIQUES/Ar* OICX BARTOW AS CALITORMIA PACKAGING
526 CAST 300 SOOTn
SALT LAJOB CITY, UTAH

84102

Yog art htrtby nottfitd that you art In default lor non-ptymtnt of rtnt for tht prtmteae occuplad by
you at tht address shown ebovt.
You ar.t furthtr notlfltd that you art to do ona of tha following:
1. WITHIN THREE OAYS aftar sarvica of thti notlct upon you, you art hartby rtqulrad to pay In full
tht rtni now owing on Iht pramiaaa at Iht abova addrass. which you now occupy,
Th* total rt«» dut »a t3,500.00
*

;

t)9tng rtnl for tht period(S) commencing IS wov. 1991

. payaoit monthly m advance, computed at tha rata of %

plua a lata f t t of $

250

-00

*

par month, amounting to tht sum of $3,750.00

t en0«

tndlng

. ptr month,
j0S, j

^ _

paid on account to data; 2 0 H * v - l 9 9 1 - AND AS PER TOUR O F T I C I A L N O T I C E , TAXED TODAY, MOW
ATTACHED AND A PART CT THIS NOTICE.

OR
2. YOU ARE REQUIRED TO VACATE SAIO PREMISES WITHIN THREE OAYS and surrtnder
possession of said premises with keys to the undersigned Owner or his duly authorized sgjnt.
IN THE EVENT of your failure to pay the said rent or to vacate tha said premises within such period of
THREE OAYS. you will be unlawfully detaining possession of sa»d oremijes. In accordance with the
provmoni o' Sectton 78-36« *0. Utah Codt Annotated. '953. you w»» be liable lor treble damages for sucn
unlawful deta'n«r. i^o action will be con , m « n ced aqamst you lo evict you ''om said oremues and to take
|udgment agamjt you lor the rent accrued o'us damages oi three limes Ihe rent lor the oeriod you are
unlawfully detaining possession of said premises, together with any damages to said premises, court costs,
and attorney s lees.
Pltaat Immediately notify tht undersigned of your intentions.
H.I.H

Ihl.

*°™

„.y

nl

HOVtHBCT

,.91

m

0»-*» m M ^ i t H l ******

\

455^tA3T

V«r»^.|

SOOTH TEMPLE,

SALT LAKE CITY,

UTAH

SUITS 3 0 0
84111

(801)363-6811
MumcJpal ordlnanc?i provide*
ft tnart bt u«<twM for any Of rion. woon victtino. or rtmonne ''Of" dwtMmoi. Hort 'oomi. or trty otntr building, to fall to rt move
til car Oioa fuoou". ind «in«t from tucf* &iHdmo i*d 0 ' i n n n md tUo tn« g/ovnd ipotnilning thtrtto, or to (ill to plica isme
m a Ihoiowgnhr unitary condition J4 nowi iHtr laid p'f •••Mil in«M bt viciitd

RETURN OF SERVICE
t certify that service of thte notice waa comoieted In accordance with the provisions of Section 78-30-3
and Section 78-35-6. Utah Code Annotated, 1953. on (date) ~Z0 f^hHsfi at (place) t^-Lbr? "*&*&>*
tfc delivering a copy to Ihe tenant oeraonally.

OR

D sending a cooy through certified or registered mail, addrassed to the tenant at his place of residence.
OR
O leaving a cooy with
a person of suitable age and discretion at tht tenant's
residence or place of busineai, and by mailing a second copy to the Tenant at said residence, or place of
buameas,
OR
D affixing a copy In a conaolcuoue place on tht rented premises, afler falling to find anyone there.
^£faxing

a copy

t o OICX BARTON a t CALIFORNIA PACKAGING

Subacrlbtd and sworn to before me on this
residing at
My

flommimon

tvpirts

A

M31016?8-0998.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, on this £)
of February, 1994, to:
Richard N. Cannon, Esq.
56 East Broadway, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

•\

2342\mlb\bnef2 «pp
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